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Quantum mechanics provides several methods to generate and securely distribute private lists of
numbers suitably correlated to solve the Three Byzantine Generals Problem. So far, these methods
are based on three-qutrit singlet states, four-qubit entangled states, and three or two pairwise
quantum key distribution channels. Here we show that the problem can be solved using a single
qutrit. This scheme presents some advantages over previous schemes, and emphasizes the specific
role of qutrits in basic quantum information processing.
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It has been recently shown that optimal quantum solu-
tions for some multiparty communication tasks do not re-
quire entanglement. Protocols using only the sequential
communication of a single qubit have been demonstrated
for secret sharing [1] and some communication complex-
ity problems [2]. These protocols were shown to be much
more resistant to noise and imperfections than previous
protocols based on entanglement. Here we shall present
a new example of a problem which can find an optimal
quantum solution in the form of a sequential exchange of
a single quantum system.
The Three Byzantine Generals Problem (TBGP) ex-
presses abstractly the problem of achieving coordination
between the nonfaulty components of a distributed com-
putation when some components fail [3, 4]. Three divi-
sions of the Byzantine army, each commanded by its own
general, are besieging an enemy city. The three generals,
Alexander, Buonaparte, and Clausevitz (A, B, and C)
can communicate with one another by messenger only
(i.e., by pairwise authenticated error-free classical chan-
nels). They must decide upon a common plan of action:
either to attack (0) or to retreat (1). The commanding
general A decides on a plan and communicates this plan
to the other two generals by sending B a message mAB
(either 0 or 1), and by sending C a message mAC . Then,
B communicates the plan to C by sending him a message
mBC , and C communicates the plan to B by sending him
a message mCB. However, one of the generals (including
A) might be a traitor, trying to keep the loyal generals
from agreeing on a plan. The TBGP is to find a way
in which: (i) all loyal generals follow the same plan, and
(ii) if A is loyal, then every loyal general follows the plan
decided by A.
The TBGP is unsolvable [3, 4], unless the generals
share some suitable private data. Each of the generals
must be in possession of a list of numbers unknown to
the other generals, but suitably correlated with the corre-
sponding lists of the other generals. There is no method,
neither classical nor quantum, to guarantee the success
of the distribution of the required lists. Nevertheless,
a variation of the TBGP, called Detectable Byzantine
Agreement (DBA) or Detectable Broadcast [5, 6], which
is unsolvable by classical means [7], can be solved using
quantum resources [5, 6, 8–12]. In the DBA, conditions
(i) and (ii) are relaxed so (i’) either all loyal generals fol-
low the same plan or all abort, and (ii’) if A is loyal, then
either every loyal general follows the plan decided by A
or aborts.
Quantum mechanics provides several methods to gen-
erate and securely distribute the required lists. So far,
these methods are based on three-qutrit singlet states
[5, 8, 9], four-qubit entangled states [10, 12], and three
[6] or two [11] pairwise quantum key distribution (QKD)
channels. In this Letter we introduce a protocol to gen-
erate and securely distribute these lists using a single
qutrit. We assume that A, B, and C can communicate
with one another by pairwise authenticated error-free
classical channels and pairwise authenticated quantum
channels.
Correlated lists and their use.—The goal of the proto-
col is to distribute three lists, lA known only by A, lB
known only by B, and lC known only by C, all of the
same length L, with the property that if 0 (1) is at po-
sition j in lA, then 0 (1) is at position j both in lB and
in lC , and if 2 is at position j in lA, then 0 is at posi-
tion j in one of the other lists and 1 is at position j in
the other. The combinations 201 and 210 occur with the
same probability [10, 12].
Before we proceed further, note that, on one hand,
A knows exactly at which positions the lists lA and lB
2TABLE I: At the beginning of step (ii), C has received mAC in the form of lAC from A, and mBC in the form of lBC from
B. The table shows what C will do, depending on what C obtains when he checks the consistency between these data and his
own list lC . {mAC , lAC} ∼= lC means that mAC and lAC are found to be consistent with lC , 6∼= means “inconsistent with,” and
⊥ means “I have received inconsistent data.”
If then C will follow the plan
(iia) {mAC , lAC} ∼= lC & {mBC , lBC} ∼= lC &mAC = mBC mAC = mBC (no traitor)
(iib) {mAC , lAC} ∼= lC & {mBC , lBC} ∼= lC &mAC 6= mBC previously decided by B and C (A is the traitor)
(iic) {mAC , lAC} ∼= lC &mBC = ⊥ mAC (although A can be the traitor)
(iid) {mAC , lAC} ∼= lC & {mBC , lBC} 6∼= lC mAC (B is the traitor)
(iie) {mAC , lAC} 6∼= lC & {mBC , lBC} ∼= lC mBC (A is the traitor)
(iif) {mAC , lAC} 6∼= lC &mBC = ⊥ previously decided by B and C (A is the traitor)
are perfectly correlated, and at which positions they are
anticorrelated (but in this case he has no faintest idea
who has 1 and who has 0). On the other hand, B and C
do not know whether their data at a given position are
correlated or anticorrelated.
Once the parties have these lists, they can use them
to reach an agreement following a protocol introduced in
[12] and summarized here for completeness’ sake:
(i) When A wants to send B a messagemAB (attack, 1,
or retreat, 0) he sends B a list lAB of all of the positions
in lA in which the value mAB appears. After that, if A
is loyal he will follow his plan of military action.
The roles of B and C are symmetrical, and thus ev-
erything we say about B applies to C and vice versa.
When B receives mAB in the form of lAB, only one of
two things are allowed to happen:
(ia) If lAB is of the appropriate length (i.e., approx-
imately L/3), and lAB, and lB are consistent at each
position j (i.e. they fulfill the property of the lists), then
B will follow the plan mAB implied by the received lAB
unless C convinces him that A is the traitor in the next
step [see (ii)].
(ib) If lAB and lB are inconsistent, then B ascertains
that A is the traitor and B will not follow any plan until
he reaches an agreement with C in the next step [see (ii)].
(ii) The message mBC B sends C can be not only 0
or 1, but also ⊥, meaning “I have received inconsistent
data.” If the message to be conveyed, mAC is 0 or 1, B
sends C a list lBC which is, if he is loyal and so is A,
the same list lAB that B has received from A. After C
receives mBC in the form of lBC , he compares it with
mAC received earlier in the form of lAC . Then, only one
of six situations can happen, which are listed in the Table
I.
Quantum distribution of the lists.—Now we shall ex-
plain the quantum protocol for distributing these lists.
The three generals have devices which can unitarily
transform qutrits. In addition, general A has also a
source of qutrits and general C has a detection station.
The three generals act according to the following proto-
col.
(I) Initial state. A prepares his qutrit in the state
|ψ0〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉). (1)
(II) A sets the basis. His first choice is the “basis
choice”, which is to decide whether he will be coding his
number in the basis I, in which case he does not perform
any initial unitary transformation, or in the basis II, in
which case he acts with a unitary operator
UII =
1√
3


1 0 0
0 ei 2pi/3 0
0 0 ei 2pi/3

 . (2)
Note that, from the interferometric point of view, the
type II operation has no effects on the beam 0 and in-
troduces a phase shift by 2pi/3 in the beams 1 and 2.
(III) A encodes the number. The next choice of A is to
encode one of the three random numbers 0, 1, and 2 (all
with the same probability). If he wants to encode n, he
performs
U(n) =
1√
3


1 0 0
0 ei 2npi/3 0
0 0 e−i 2npi/3

 . (3)
After that, the qutrit is sent to general B.
(IV) B chooses the basis. B either performs UII (type
II basis encoding) or does nothing (type I).
(V) B encodes the number. B is allowed to encode 0
or 1 with equal probabilities. If he is to encode 0, he
does nothing, that is U(0), in the other case he acts with
U(1). He then sends the qutrit to general C.
(VI) C chooses the basis and encodes the number in
exactly the same way as B.
(VII) C measures the qutrit using a device that distin-
guishes the state |ψ0〉 given by (1) from any two other
states orthogonal to it, e.g., an unbiased multiport beam-
splitter.
(VIII) If C gets |ψ0〉, the generals reveal their bases,
but not the encoded numbers. They do this in reverse
3order: first C, last A. If it turns out that all of them
chose to do nothing, or all of them chose to perform UII ,
the run is treated as a valid distribution of the secret
numbers.
The protocol distributes the numbers in the required
way because
U3II = 1 , (4)
where 1 is the identity matrix, and
U(k)U(l)U(m) = 1 , (5)
whenever k + l +m = 0 modulo 3.
Security.—The traitor general may be eavesdropping
either by an intercept-resend method or by entangling
the qutrit with another system. However, any of these
attacks cause a disturbance which can be detected in a
random check of some of the valid runs (exchanging the
actual numbers between the parties). To prove that the
quantum distribution of the lists is secure against these
attacks, note that, if there is no eavesdropping, the state
that the last general receives must be a pure state. Af-
ter all the generals reveal their bases (in the right time
order, first C, next B, and finally A), and if the bases
are the same, then the final state must be an eigenstate
of the final measurement basis, namely |ψ0〉. Therefore,
the measurement results should be perfectly determinis-
tic because the state of the qutrit is pure at any step of
the protocol. However, any eavesdropping by the traitor
general, which is about to give him information about
the state of the qutrit, as it is done before the bases are
revealed, must lead to correlations with classical (e.g.,
in the intercept-resend strategy) or quantum (e.g., when
entangling the qutrit with an ancilla) states of some sys-
tems monitored by the traitor. That is, the effective state
(averaged over the selected runs in which all the gener-
als claim that they set the same basis) reaching the final
measurement station is a mixed state. There does not
exist any observable for which a mixed state gives a de-
terministic prediction.
In the protocol parts of the lists must be revealed for
the cross-check for eavesdropping or cheating. If one re-
quires that the order of revealing the numbers is random,
then the traitor will not be the last one to announce his
value in approximately 2/3 of cases. In such cases, the
traitor has no way to announce a number which is always
consistent. Thus from the analysis of the errors, the loyal
generals can conclude that there was cheating. Note that,
paradoxically, in order not to be uncovered in those cases
when the traitor is chosen to be the last one to declare his
number, he must give, from time to time, an inconsistent
number (i.e., not fulfilling the (k+ l+m)mod3 = 0 rule).
Otherwise, the set of cases in which he reveals last would
look suspiciously perfect.
Furthermore, note that C could also cheat when an-
nouncing in which runs he received measurements consis-
tent with |ψ0〉. But then, the cheating is easily detectable
after the bases are revealed, since only valid runs deter-
ministically lead to |ψ0〉. This is because U2II 6= 1 , etc.
After this protocol, each of the parties has a final list.
If all the results are correctly correlated, the generals
would assume that the remaining results are correctly
correlated and will use the resulting lists lA, lB and lC
to reach an agreement, as we explained before. In case
of failure of this part, the loyal generals agree to abort.
Possible experimental implementations.—The single
qutrit required for the protocol can be realized in many
ways. One of them would be by means of the unbi-
ased multiport beamsplitters [13]. Other possibility is
time-bin [14] realization of qutrits. Furthermore, one can
use type-II spontaneous parametric down-conversion and
treat the three symmetric two-photon polarization states
as the basis state of a composite qutrit [15]. Finally, an-
other possibility is using single photons passing trough a
triple slit [16].
Advantages over QKD protocols.—The single-qutrit
scheme has two main advantages versus the the scheme
in [11]:
(i) The scheme in [11] consists of two QKD channels.
Each of them requires the preparation and the measure-
ment of qubits. Therefore, a successful distribution of
one number of the lists requires at least two detections.
Indeed, it requires four detections if the QKD is based
on von Neumann measurements on a single qubit, since
each QKD channel must transmit a trit value. If the effi-
ciency of the detectors η is not perfect, then a successful
distribution occurs with only probability η2 (more real-
istically, only with probability η4). In the single-qutrit
scheme a successful distribution occurs with probability
η. The single qutrit method scales much more efficiently
with a growing number of generals. This makes such a
scheme even more favorable.
(ii) The goal of the scheme in [11] is to distribute lists of
six combinations of numbers (0–1–2, 0–2–1, 1–0–2, 1–2–0,
2–0–1, and 2–1–0). The goal of the single-qutrit scheme
is to distribute simpler lists with a different symmetry;
lists of four combinations of numbers (0–0–0, 1–1–1, 2–0–
1, and 2–1–0). The classical part of single-qutrit scheme
is therefore more efficient than that of the scheme in [11].
Conclusions.—Single qutrits allow QKD protocols
with additional security features [17, 18], quantum ran-
dom number generation [19], and better-than-classical
performance in games which require entanglement when
they are played with two qubits [20]. Here we have pre-
sented the first application of single qutrits, which pro-
vides an optimal quantum solution to a multiparty com-
munication problem. All these results suggest that the
qutrit provides a very specific quantum resource which is
positioned between the simplest quantum superposition,
represented by the qubit, and the simplest form of en-
tanglement, represented by the two-qubit entanglement.
The authors thank N. Gisin, C. Kurtsiefer, and H.
Weinfurter for useful conversations. This work was sup-
4ported by the EU 6FP programmes QAP and SCALA,
and the Swedish Research Council (VR). A.C. acknowl-
edges support from the Spanish MEC Project No.
FIS2008-05596, and the Junta de Andaluc´ıa Excellence
Project No. P06-FQM-02243. M.Z˙. was supported by
Wenner Gren Foundation.
∗ Electronic address: boure@physto.se
† Electronic address: adan@us.es
‡ Electronic address: marek.zukowski@univie.ac.at
[1] C. Schmid, P. Trojek, M. Bourennane, C. Kurtsiefer,
M. Z˙ukowski, and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
230505 (2005).
[2] P. Trojek, C. Schmid, M. Bourennane, Cˇ. Brukner, M.
Z˙ukowski, and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. A 72, 050305
(2005).
[3] M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport, J. ACM 27, 228
(1980).
[4] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, ACM Trans. Pro-
gramming Languages and Syst. 4, 382 (1982).
[5] M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87,
217901 (2001).
[6] M. Fitzi, D. Gottesman, M. Hirt, T. Holenstein, and
A. Smith, in 21th ACM Symposium on Principles of
Distributed Computing (PODC 2002) (ACM Press, New
York, 2002), p. 118.
[7] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. Merritt, Distrib.
Comput. 1, 26 (1986).
[8] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 100402 (2002).
[9] A. Cabello, J. Mod. Opt. 50, 1049 (2003).
[10] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 68, 012304 (2003).
[11] S. Iblisdir and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 70, 034306 (2005).
[12] S. Gaertner, M. Bourennane, C. Kurtsiefer, A. Cabello,
and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 070504 (2008).
[13] M. Z˙ukowski, A. Zeilinger, and M. A. Horne, Phys. Rev.
A 55, 2564 (1997).
[14] I. Marcikic, H. de Riedmatten, W. Tittel, V. Scarani, H.
Zbinden, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 66, 062308 (2002).
[15] Yu. I. Bogdanov, M. V. Chekhova, S. P. Kulik, G. A.
Maslennikov, A. A. Zhukov, C. H. Oh, and M. K. Tey,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 230503 (2004).
[16] U. Sinha, C. Couteau, Z. Medendorp, I. So¨llner, R.
Laflamme, R. Sorkin, and G. Weihs, in Foundations of
Probability and Physics 5, edited by L. Accardi, G. Ade-
nier, C. Fuchs, G. Jaeger, A. Y. Khrennikov, J.-A˚. Lars-
son, and S. Stenholm (American Institute of Physics,
New York, 2009), p. 200.
[17] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett.
85, 3313 (2000).
[18] K. Svozil, arXiv:0903.0231.
[19] K. Svozil, Phys. Rev. A 79, 054306 (2009).
[20] N. Aharon and L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. A 77, 052310
(2008).
